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COMMENTS
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: DEATH FOR MURDER ONLY
During the decade of the 1970's, the penalty of
death has come under serious constitutional chal-
lenge through the eighth amendment's proscrip-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment. The
Supreme Court has upheld the per se constitution-
ality of capital punishment,' yet it is still faced
with numerous problems of application: For what
crimes will capital punishment be constitutionally
authorized? By what standards will those crimes be
selected? Can a definitive constitutional list be
established or will it be possible for the list of
constitutional capital offenses to be expanded?
This comment, after exploring the history of the
eighth amendment and its relationship to capital
punishment, will examine and attempt to answer
these questions in light of this history and the
plethora of recent Supreme Court decisions.
HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT'S PROSCRIPTION AGAINST CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The prohibition against excessive punishment
can be traced back in Western civilization to the
Bible's Old Testament. 2 The prohibition against
"cruel and unusual" punishments, however, can be
traced back no further than the English Bill of
Rights of 1689.3 At the time the phrase was incor-
porated into the English Bill of Rights, it was
considered "first an objection to the imposition of
punishments which were unauthorized by statute
and outside the jurisdiction of the sentencing court,
and second, a reiteration of the English policy
against disproportionate penalties." 4 However, ac-
'Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 194 (1976).
2 Leviticus 24:19-20 (Revised Standard Version 1952).
One of the Laws given to Moses by God, an eye for an
eye and a tooth for a tooth, though today viewed as
merely retribution, may be viewed as the delimitation of
the upper limits of punishment. See Granucci, "Nor Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57
CALIF. L. REX'. 839, 852-53 (1969) (Granucci's article
was cited in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 169, for inter-
preting the meaning of the eighth amendment).
3 Granucci, supra note 2. The tenth declaratory clause
of the English Bill of Rights reads: "That excessive bail
ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.
4 Id. at 860.
cording to Granucci, infliction of "barbarous" pun-
ishments that were proportionate to the crime were
not considered cruel and unusual.5
The English cruel and unusual phrase was well
known to the Americans who incorporated it into
the American Bill of Rights. Reverend Nathaniel
Ward of Ipswich, Massachusetts introduced the
concept of cruel and barbarous punishments into
the colonial laws through his writings entitled Body
of Liberties.6 Ward wrote: "For bodily punishments
we allow amongst us none that are inhumane,
barbarous or cruel.",7 His emphasis on the "bar-
barous" nature of punishments influenced inter-
pretation of the phrase in America.
By the time the first Congress included the Eng-
lish Bill of Rights' phraseology of cruel and unusual
punishment into the eighth amendment of the
United States Constitution, the clause had come to
mean something quite different from unauthorized
and disproportionate penalties.8 A greater empha-
sis was placed on the barbarous nature of the cruel
and unusual phrase. Evidence of the subtle change
in meaning can be seen in the debates of the
various state conventions called to ratify the Con-
stitution as well as in the debates of the first
Congress considering the Bill of Rights. Patrick
Henry, a delegate to the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion, strongly opposed the absence of a "cruel and
unusual punishment" proscription in the Consti-
tution:
What has distinguished our ancestors?-That they
would not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous
punishments. But Congress may introduce the prac-
tice of the civil law, in preference to that of the
common law. They may introduce the practice of
France, Spain, and Germany-of torturing, to extort
a confession of the crime.9
Complaints of a similar nature were voiced *at the
Massachusetts convention: "They [Congress] are
5 Id. at 844.
This writing served as the laws of colonial Massachu-
setts in 1641.
7Granucci, supra note 2, at 851.
8 
Id. at 860.
9 3 J. ELI.IOr, THE DEBATEs IN "TE'. SEVERAL Sm-rF
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPrION OF THi-: FEDERAL
CONr'UTION 447-48 (1881).
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nowhere restrained from inventing the most un-
heard-of punishments and annexing them to
crimes; and there is no constitutional check on
them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst
the most mild instruments of their discipline."
10
The recurring theme of these attacks made upon
the proposed Constitution was the fear of barba-
rous punishments, inflicted by Congress without
constitutional check. The congressional expressions
of concern regarding cruel and unusual punish-
ment centered primarily around quieting those
fears regarding barbarous and disproportionate
punishments."
EARLY EIGHTH AMENDMENT CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT CASES
The first eighth amendment case dealing with
capital punishment did not challenge the consti-
tutionality of the theory of capital penalties, but
rather challenged the method of execution em-
ployed in carrying out the sentence.1 2 Wilkerson v.
Utah,'3 determined that shooting was not a cruel
and unusual mode of executing the-death penalty
for the crime of murder. The appellant, Wilkerson,
being charged and convicted of first degree murder,
challenged his sentence of death by shooting on the
basis that the trial court had no statutory power to
authorize shooting as the method of execution. The
Supreme Court, in rejecting his arguments, stated
that while cruel and unusual punishments were
forbidden by the Constitution, the punishment of
death, executed by shooting, was not included
within those categories of punishments.14 The
Court's conclusion was reached, however, after an
evaluation of the various methods used to carry
out a capital sentence, not as a result of an inves-
tigation into whether death itself was cruel and
unusual." In further describing what categories of
punishments were proscribed by the eighth amend-
ment, the Court, after acknowledging the evasive-
10 2 id. at 111 (emphasis in original).
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 782-83 (1789).
12 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
13Id. at 134-35. The Court refused to face the eighth
amendment-capital punishment issue squarely, deciding
instead that the eighth amendment did not apply to state
action. Although it was not until Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962), that the Court finally ruled that the
eighth amendment did apply to state action through the
fourteenth amendment, the earlier cases did not have to
reach this issue, because they found that the penalties
imposed in the various cases did not violate the cruel and
unusual standard. See note 21 infra.
14 99 U.S. at 134-35.
'5Id. at 134.
ness of the standard of cruel and unusual, adopted
the theory that punishments involving torture and
unnecessary cruelty were forbidden.'
6
The Supreme Court's first approval of capital
punishment per se was evidenced in dicta of In re
Kemmler.17 Kemmler, convicted of first degree mur-
der, challenged again the constitutionality of the
method of execution, which this time was electro-
cution.'8 The Court, after citing Wilkerson with
approval, stated: "Punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the mean-
ing of that word as used in the Constitution. It
implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of
life."' 9 More was needed than the mere extinguish-
ment of a human life for the eighth amendment to
prevent an execution for a capital crime; however,
the Court failed to further enunciate the param-
eters of that 'something more" in Kemmler.
In 1946 the Court decided Louisiana ex rel. Francis
v. Resweber,20 based upon a set of facts ironically
close to the worst fears argued by the petitioner in
Kemmler. The prisoner, Francis, convicted of mur-
der and sentenced to be electrocuted to death,
survived the attempted electrocution, presumably
due to a mechanical malfunction.2' The question
before the Court was whether a second attempt to
carry out the sentence of death by electrocution
would violate the eighth amendment.2 Allowing
the state to issue a second warrant to put the
prisoner to death, the Court reaffirmed the basic
tenet of Kemmler and Wilkerson when it stated:
16 Id. at 136. The Court failed to articulate any test of
what was unnecessarily cruel and unusual.
17 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
18 Kemmler's position was that based upon the scien-
tific evidence presented at his habeas corpus hearing, a
sufficient force of electricity could not be produced to kill
a human being quickly and with certainty thus the
punishment to be inflicted upon him would be cruel and
unusual.
'9 136 U.S. at 447.
20329 U.S. 459 (1946).
21 Id at 460.
22A second issue not germane to this comment was
whether a second attempt to electrocute Francis violated
the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. The
Court assumed without deciding that violation of either
the fifth or eighth amendments would also violate the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause through
which Francis attacked the efforts of the state to attempt
a second execution. The Court also found no fifth amend-




The cruelty against which the Constitution protects
a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of
punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in
any method employed to extinguishlifehumanely....
There is no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain nor
any unnecessary pain involved in the proposed exe-
cution.... We cannot agree that the hardship im-
posed upon the petitioner rises to that level of hard-
ship denounced as denial of due process because of
cruelty i
In interpreting just what the eighth amendment
does proscribe, one commentator has suggested
that a punishment for a statutorily declared crime
which was equivalent to the punishment for that
crime at common law, would not be cruel and
unusual in constitutional terms.24 The courts took
a similar position early that the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition pertained to certain methods of
punishment.
On the basis of Wilkerson, Kemmler and Francis,
one might argue that, although the Court never
frontally addressed an eighth amendment chal-
lenge to capital punishment, the Court had sub
silentio approved the constitutionality of the pen-
alty.25 Yet the Court failed to articulate any criteria
for applying the cruel and unusual proscription.
The first Supreme Court cases attempting to state
such criteria were non-capital punishment cases.
IMPORTANT NON-CAPITAL EIGHTH
AMENDMENT CASES
Eighth amendment decisions dealing with non-
capital penalties have given the cruel and unusual
prohibition another dimension beyond an exami-
nation of the barbarous methods employed in
carrying out sentences.26 In Weems v. United States,27
the Court was presented with an application of the
cruel and unusual prohibition outside the context
of capital punishment. This particular case in-
volved the cruel and unusual proscription which
had been incorporated into the Philippine Bill of
23 329 U.S. at 464 (emphasis added).
I T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGIS-
LATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UN-
ION 694 (8th ed. 1927).
25 The idea that death itself was not subject to an
eighth amendment attack is highlighted by the Court
noting in Wilkerson that the defendant did not even
attempt to raise that issue. 99 U.S. at 136-37.
26 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (Warren,
C.J., plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
27217 U.S. 349 (1910).
Rights.28 The chief controversy centered around
the punishment for falsifying a public record by a
government official.2 Finding that the penalty
provided for did violate the cruel and unusual ban,
the Court stated that the eighth amendment was
not limited to proscribing punishments considered
merely "obsolete." Rather, the Court held that the
amendment should be considered "progressive,"
acquiring meaning as the public becomes "en-
lightened by a humane justice."' 3° The importance
of this concept to the capital punishinent issue
cannot be overemphasized. Had a different inter-
pretation been given to the clause, one which
would have frozen the penalties banned by the
cruel and unusual language to those that were
considered cruel and unusual at the time of the
provision's inclusion into the Constitution, clearly
the penalty of death would have to be conceded
by all to be constitutional.3 '
The conceptual framework of the eighth amend-
ment standard was again considered to be the
progressive yet elusive test of "humane justice" in
Trop v. Dulles. 2 This case was another non-capital
punishment eighth amendment case with impor-
tant ramifications for capital penalties. In Trop the
Court struck down a non-capital criminal penalty
as being violative of the eighth amendment.? Chief
" The Court held that a provision of the Philippine
Bill of Rights taken verbatim from the United States
Constitution must have the same meaning, 217 U.S. at
367, and so interpreted the Philippine provision in the
same way as its American counterpart.
The penalty was a fine of 4,000 pesos, hard labor for
the state from 12 to 20 years with chained ankles and
wrists, perpetual disqualification from political rights,
including the rights to vote and hold office, and subjec-
tion to surveillance for life. 217 U.S. at 351.
3 Id. at 378.
31 The most recent exponent of such an interpretation
was Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 308 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting),
where he stated: "As an original proposition, it is by no
means clear that the prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishment embodied in the Eighth AmendMent
... was not limited to those punishments deemed cruel
and unusual at the time of the adoption of the Bill of
Rights." Id. Justice Rehnquist is not alone in this inter-
pretation. In the Weems case itself, Justices White and
Holmes dissented arguing this very point. 217 U.S. at
389-413 (White, Holmes, J.J., dissenting).
32 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality
opinion).
The issue in Trop was whether denationalization of
a natural born United States citizen was a constitutional
penalty for conviction of desertion from the Armed Serv-
ices during time of war. The Court found that such a
penalty did in fact go beyond the eighth amendment and
the sentence was struck down. Id at 103.
Justice Warren, speaking for the four Justice plu-
rality,: contended that while the "still widely ac-
cepted" penalty of death could not then be consid-
ered violative of the eighth amendment, "the basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man. ' :3" This con-
clusion was reached without much discussion. After
referring to the English background of the eighth
amendment, the "dignity of man" standard was
simply set forth. Nevertheless, considerations of
whether a punishment is "humane" or within "the
dignity of man" added a new dimension to the
constitutional inquiry, thus opening the door for
future attacks on the constitutionality of the pen-
alty of death itself. Though early attempts to col-
laterally attack capital punishment through attack-
ing the method of execution had not met with
success,a3" the opponents of capital punishment
could now hope that by providing the Court with
evidence that the penalty of death was contrary to
the "dignity of man," the eighth amendment could
directly prohibit the use of capital punishment.
TiHE Ft'R.IAN CONTROVERSY
On at least two occasions after the Trop decision
the Court refused to entertain arguments on the
per se constitutionality of the death penalty. The
Court avoided the issue by limiting certiorari to
the procedural aspects of capital punishment
trials.3 7 The first time the Court actually heard
arguments on the per se constitutionality of capital
punishment was in Furman v. Georgia."" However,
: Chief Justice Warren was joined by Justices Black,
l)ouglas and Whittaker. Justices Frankfurter, Burton,
Clark and I larlan dissented. Id. at 114. Justice Brennan
cast the final vote in an opinion concurring with the
result of the plurality, hut on different grounds. Id. at
10)5.
" 356 U.S. at 99, l(t1.
" See Franci,. 329 U.S. 459 (1947): Kenmnder. 1:36 U.S.
-136 (1890): and II'ilkerson. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
"'See McGautha v. California. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
,ert. granted 398 U.S. 936 (1970) (review limited to con-
stitutionality of unguided jury discretion): and Wither-
Spoon v. Illinois. 391 U.S. 510. cert. granted, 389 U.S. 1035
(1968) (review limited to ccnstittitonality of excluding
venireien opposed to capital punishment).
:18401 U.S. 2:18 (1972). Furman was decided together
with Jackson v. Georgia. No. i9-50:30 and Branch v.
Texas, No. 69 5031. Furinait a black 26 year uld male
%,ithi a sixth grade education was convicted of iturder.
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and
sentence. 225 Ga. 253. 167 S.E.2d 628 (1969). Jackson
was a black 21 year old male. Ile was serving a three
year senteu'nce for auto theft when lie escaped front a work
gang and raped a white woman. I lis sentence of death
fin- ihe rape was affirned by the ;eorgia Supreme Court.
the Court effectively sidestepped answering the
fundamental question of the eighth amendment's
cruel and unusual clause by phrasing the issue to
be decided as whether the death penalty, as applied
in the cases before it, violated the eighth amend-
ment. The result of the fragmented, nine opinion
decision was a per curiam ruling which held that the
Georgia statute,' 9 as applied, violated the eighth
and fourteenth amendments for being cruel and
unusual punishment.40 Five Justices concurred
with the result 4' and four Justices dissented.
42 Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall were ready to declare
any death penalty impermissible; 4 Justices Black-
mun, Powell, Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger
were willing to declare capital punishment not per
se unconstitutional;"4 while the remaining three
Justices, Douglas, Stewart and White, left the ques-
tion open for future determination.4 5
In examining the five concurring opinions, one
can discern three different rationales. One rationale
focused on the uncontrolled nature of the jury's
discretion which could result in arbitrary and ca-
pricious imposition of the death penalty. This most
clearly can be seen in Justice Stewart's opinion
where he compared being sentenced to death to
being struck by lightning. 46 The freakish way in
which juries were perceived to apply the penalty of
death was thought to be an impermissible system
225 Ga. 790, 171 S.E.2d 501 (1969). Branch was also a
black, and also sentenced to death for the rape of a white
wonman. lis sentence was affirmed by the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas. 447 S.W.2d 932 (Tt.-x. CRiNI.
1969).
39 GA. COiE ANN. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971) (effective
prior toJuly 1, 1969). As noted, Furnan was consolidated
with two other cases, Jackson v. Georgia, No. 69-5030,
and Branch v. Texas, No. 69-5031. These other cases
involved GA. Cotp- ANN. § 26-1302 (Stipp. 1971) (effec-
tive prior to July 1. 1969) (providing death for the crime
Cf rape). and T:x. PENAi.COiE ANN., art. 1189 (Vernon,
1961) (providing death for the crime of rape). All three
statutes were found unconstitutional as applied.
. 408 U.S. at 239-40.
' Id. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring), 257 (Brennan,
J., concurring), 306 (Stewart.J., concurring). 310 (White,
J., concurring), 314 (Marshall, J., concurring).
42 Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (joined by Black-
mnu, Powell, and Rehnquist, J.J.), 465 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
4" Id. at 257 (Brennanj., concurring), 314 (Marshall,
J., concurring).
44 h. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (joined by Black-
inan. Powell and Rehnquist, J.J.), 465 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
45 Id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring), 306 (Stewart, J..
concurring). 3110 (White, J., concurring).
"Id. at 309-- 10 (Stewart, ., concurring).
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of justice.47 Justice White echoed this rationale in
his concurring opinion when he emphasized his
belief that because juries impose death so infre-
quently, 48 the retribution justification for capital
punishment could never be satisfied no matter how
much the individual defendant may deserve death
as a punishment.4 9 If the underlying justification
for the punishment is missing, then there remains
no justification for imposing that penalty. Simi-
larly, Justice White suggested that the deterrence
justification for capital punishment is not served
by the infrequent imposition of death as a penalty.
"[C]ommon sense and experience tell us that sel-
dom-enforced laws become ineffective measures for
controlling human conduct and that the death
penalty, unless imposed with sufficient frequency,
will make little contribution to deterring those
crimes for which it may be exacted. ' 5°
The rationale of uncontrolled jury discretion and
infrequent imposition as a constitutional flaw ap-
pears to conflict with an earlier holding in Mc-
Gautha v. California,5s which concluded that a jury
need not be provided with standards to guide its
discretion in whether to recommend a sentence of
death or life imprisonment. The dissenters in Fur-
man were all of one voice in pointing out the
apparent inconsistency of the two cases and attack-
ing the concurring opinions for being unable to
legitimately distinguish McGautha from Furman.
5 2
Justice Stewart, the main proponent of the jury
discretion rationale, avoided mention of Mc-
Gautha.s5
A second underlying rationale that can be dis-
tilled from the concurring opinions is that the
death penalty was unconstitutional in Furman be-
cause it was employed in a discriminatory fashion.
Justices Douglass and Marshall s5 attempted to
471d at 310.
48 At the time Furman was decided in 1972, no one had
been excuted in the United States since 1967. U.S. Bu-
REAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP"T OF COMMERCE, HISTORI.
CAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STA'ES: COLONIAL
TIMES TO 1970, at 422 (1975).
49 408 U.S. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
50 Id. at 312.
5' 402 U.S. 183, 196 (197 1).
52408 U.S. at 398-401 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(joined by Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, J.J.), 427
n. 11 (Powell, J., dissenting).
53 The avoidance of this issue by the main proponent
of the jury discretion rationale and the author of the
Stewart plurality in Gregg merely delayed confrontation
with the holding of McGautha. See text accompanying
notes 118-20 infra.
Id. at 249-51 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 365-66 (Marshall. J., concurring).
establish that the use of capital punishment dis-
criminated against various socio-economic and ra-
cial groups.56 The principal assumption behind
their arguments was that the penalty of death was
the poor man's punishment; more specifically, it
was the poor black man's punishment. According
to Justice Douglas, if the death penalty was to be
applied against such groups solely because of their
race or economic standing, while other convicted
criminals, equally culpable, received less than
death as a penalty then: "[T]hese discretionary
statutes are unconstitutional in their operation.
They are pregnant with discrimination and dis-
crimination is an ingredient not compatible with
the ideal of equal protection of the laws that is
implicit in the ban on 'cruel and unusual' punish-
ments."
57
Justice Stewart, briefly addressing himself to this
issue, maintained that racial or economic discrim-
ination had not been established in Furman and
therefore should not be considered. 58 Indeed, none
of the other Justices found racial discrimination to
be a factor.
59
- See note 38 supra, for the backgrounds of the defend-
ants in Furman.
s7 408 U.S. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
a Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
59 Empirical studies not presented in Furman indicate
mixed results on these questions of economic and racial
bias. A Stanford study of the California standardlessjury
sentencing system between 1958 and 1966 indicated that
once other variables were removed, "the defendant's race
had no effect on the penalty variable." Note, A Study of
the California Penalty in First-Degree Murder Cases, 21 STAN.
L. REv. 1297, 1421 (1969). An analysis of capital punish-
ment in Virginia, however, indicated the opposite con-
clusion that racial discrimination does affect the appli-
cation of the death penalty. Note, 58 VA. L. REv. 97,
134-35 (1972). The study noted that "[wlhile only fifty-
five percent of those persons committed to penal institu-
tions for rape during the 1908 to 1963 period have been
blacks, one hundred percent of those executed for this
offense have been blacks." Id. Another study of capital
punishment, this time in Texas, supported the Virginia
findings in rape cases concluding that "[tihe Negro con-
victed of rape is far more likely to get the death penalty
than a term sentence." Koeninger, Capital Punishment in
Texas 1924-1968, 15 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 132, 141
(1969). Unfortunately the latter two studies only pre-
sented raw statistical information and made no attempt
to remove other, factors so as to isolate race. Another
concern which must be taken into account is the geo-
graphical locations of the studies. Given varying social
attitudes throughout different regions of the country, it
could be possible that all are correct in that in Virginia
and Texas there was racial discrimination while in Cali-
fornia none is present.
Regarding economic discrimination, the Stanford
study found that a blue collar background was an aggra-
1978]
The third underlying rationale of the concurring
opinions in Furman can best be described as the
influence of morality. The moral implications of
the death penalty were considered at length by
Justice Brennan and at least implicitly dealt with
by Justices Marshall and White. Justice Brennan
concluded from his interpretation of the American
and English history of the death penalty that the
battle over capital punishment has long been
fought on moral grounds.60 Based upon the fact
that death had become such a rarely used form of
punishment and that when it was imposed it was
an unusually severe punishment, Brennan was pre-
pared to say that he completely rejected capital
punishment as "fatally offensive to human dig-
nity., 61 Justice Brennan rejected the deterrence
and retribution justifications for capital punish-
ment based upon his interpretation of society's
rejection of those justifications: "Obviously, con-
cepts ofjustice change; no immutable moral order
requires death for murderers and rapists.... [O]ur
society wishes to prevent crime; we have no desire
to kill criminals simply to get even with them."
6 2
It is difficult to analyze Brennan's opinion without
concluding that his ultimate decision against cap-
ital punishment is based upon his own moral con-
victions.63 His conclusions were not based on any
announced authority, leaving the reader to infer
that his personal beliefs formed the authority on
which he relied. One may quarrel with whether a
Justice should ever inject his own personal beliefs
into the Constitution. When dealing with a provi-
sion as amorphous as the eighth amendment's ban
on cruel and unusual punishment, however, it is
vating influence while a white collar background was a
mitigating factor in determining whether to impose death
as a penalty. See 21 SIAN. L. REv. at 1421. The Texas
study similarly concluded that application of capital
punishment was not equal, and that most of those that
were executed fit into the poor, young and ignorant
category. See 15 CRIME & DELINQUENCY at 141.
60 408 U.S. at 296 (Brennan, J., concurring). See id. at
316-28 (Marshall. J., concurring), for the specifics of the
history Brennan relies on which mainly consists of an
examination of the Court's treatment of the cruel and
unusual proscription.
61 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J.. concurring).
62 Id. at 304-05.
63 This conclusion is reinforced by Justice Brennan's
dissent in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 227, 229 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting):
This Court inescapably has the duty ... to say
whether ... "moral concepts" require us to hold
that the law has progressed to the point where we
should declare that the punishment of death ... is
no longer morally tolerable in a civilized society.
My opinion in Furman v. Georgia concluded that our
civilization and law had progressed to this point....
difficult to see how personal sentiments can be
totally excluded from the analysis, especially when
the applicable standard according to Brennan is
the "dignity of man."
While not directly phrasing the language of his
opinion in terms of morality, Justice Marshall still
took a position somewhat similar to that of Justice
Brennan. Marshall explained his vote against cap-
ital punishment in all circumstances by concluding
that if the "average citizen" was fully aware of all
of the varied facts involved in the capital punish-
ment controversy he would "find it [capital pun-
ishment] shocking to his conscience and sense of
justice." ' Marshall reasoned that in casting his
vote against capital punishment per se, he was
merely exercising the choice of all of the people
were they as informed as he. In essence he was
stating his conception of the standards of morality
in the community at large. Justice Marshall's opin-
ion thus attempted to remove himself from the
analysis and base his decision on some external
factors (i.e., the standards of society). Although this
is a more circuitous route, it led to the same
resolution of the moral question as did Justice
Brennan's more straightforward approach.
Justice White's view more closely resembled Jus-
tice Marshall's opinion than that of Justice Bren-
nan's in that White drew essentially a subjective
conclusion based obstensibly upon some other ex-
ternal objectives. White reasoned that if the death
penalty could not be shown to have some deterrent
effect, it should be held unconstitutional as it would
then merely provide for the "needless extinction of
life." 65 White, however, reserved the right to up-
hold death as a penalty should he be convinced
that capital punishment served more than just the
needless extinction of life. Reserving the final de-
cision separates Justice White's approach from that
of both Justices Brennan and Marshall. White's
analysis would appear to be based on traditional
penology and to be more receptive to empirical
evidence. Marshall's conclusion was based on what
society "should" conclude about capital punish-
ment, and Brennan's conclusion was based on his
own interpretation of society's rejection of the
death penalty.
Speaking through Chief Justice Burger, the dis-
senters objected to the intrusion of the morality
issue into the constitutional equation. What Bren-
nan and Marshall were doing, the Chief Justice
charged, was to usurp the legislative power of the
states by restricting capital punishment based on
64 408 U.S. at 369 (Marshall, J., concurring).
65 Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
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their own moral value judgements. The Chief Jus-
tice countered with his own view of the Court's
duty by saying:
Our constitutional inquiry ... must be divorced
from personal feelings as to the morality and efficacy
of the death penalty, and be confined to the meaning
and applicability of the uncertain language of the
Eighth Amendment .... [Ilt is essential to our role
as a court that we not seize upon the enigmatic
character of the guarantee as an invitation to enact
our personal predilections into law.6
Burger looked to the legislative judgments of the
states and the historical background of the eighth
amendment, discussed above, and determined that
the eighth amendment did not per se invalidate
capital punishment. He noted that thirty-nine
states, the District of Columbia and the federal
government had capital statutes on the books for
at least some crimes.6 This indicated to the Chief
Justice that there was considerable public senti-
ment to find death an acceptable sanction in at
least some circumstances.
Because all capital statutes allowed unbridled
jury discretion in determining the penalty, the
Chief Justice recognized that the effect of Furman
would be to force all states that still wanted to
impose death as a penalty to re-evaluate capital
punishment in a contemporary setting to deter-
mine the efficacy of capital punishment in today's
society. Burger welcomed this opportunity for the
states to re-evaluate their statutes and policies be-
cause he believed that the legislatures were the
appropriate level at which such determinations
could be most effectively made.
6
8
After Furman the largest question unanswered
was whether the Court would declare death per se
unconstitutional as a sanction for any crime under
any circumstance. The Court had split in so many
directions that any prediction of how the issue
would eventually be resolved was of necessity guess-
work. The Furman opinions gave no hint of how to
meet the eighth and fourteenth amendment chal-
lenges. The case Simply stated that the particular
capital punishment statutes, as applied, violated
the cruel and unusual provision of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments.69 As for rationales for the
result, one could take one's pick. 70
The practical result of Furman, as predicted by
6 Id. at 375-76 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
67 Id. at 385 & n.7.
mId. at 403.
0 Id. at 239-40.70 See text accompanying notes 46-65 supra.
Chief Justice Burger, was to force all of the states
that desired to retain death as a penalty to review
and amend their capital punishment statutes. Thus
the states directly had the capital punishment issue
before them, with the opportunity to make judg-
ments as to whether death should remain as a
penalty. Indeed, there was considerable legislative
activity in the years immediately following the
Furman decision. Thirty-five of the thirty-nine states
that had pre-Furman death penalty statutes re-en-
acted capital punishment for at least the crime of
murder, as that crime was defined in each state.7'
Three of the remaining four states that had pre-
Furman death penalty statutes simply left those
statutes on the books without modification.72 While
this survey does not take into consideration the
states' judicial response, the important factor was
the legislative response; because regardless of
whether the re-enactment of the capital statutes
were procedurally valid, these initial legislative
responses were clear indications of contemporary
values concerning the "dignity of man."
Turning to the procedural questions of the states'
capital punishment response, two different types of
statutes were enacted in the post-Furman legislative
activity. One response was the mandatory sentenc-
ing statute, illustrated by the law re-enacted by
Louisiana: "Whoever commits the crime of first
degree murder shall be punished by death."73
There is no discretion under such statutes for a
jury to arbitrarily, capriciously or freakishly impose
the sentence of death on only certain defendants
while meting out different punishment for other
guilty defendants. Eliminating all jury discretion
was viewed as one way to satisfy at least the first
two underlying rationales in Furman.74 Under a
mandatory sentencing system, it was assumed that
juries could not discriminate against racial or social
groups unless they convicted only members of dis-
favored groups and acquitted most of all other
defendants charged with capital offenses. Yet this
type of discrimination was perceived as actually
occurring under the mandatory death penalty stat-
71 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 179-80 n.23.
72 Kansas (K.S.A. § 21-3401, 21-4501 (1969)), New
Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 113-4 (West 1924)) and
South Dakota (S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 22-16-12
(1939)) were the three states that left their pre-Furman
captal statutes on their books.
LA. REV. STAr. ANN. § 14:30 (amended 1973).
74 For discussion of the three underlying rationales of
Furman, see text accompanying notes 46-65 supra. Since
the third rationale was based on morality, no alternative
procedural system could possibly satisfy Justices Marshall
and Brennan.
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utes of the nineteenth century.75 The discrimina-
tion and general reluctance of juries to return
verdicts of guilty, knowing the only sentence could
be death, perverted the criminal justice system.
Jury nullification, as this concept is called, was one
of the reasons why all the states rejected mandatory
sentences76 in favor of the discretionary sentencing
statutes prior to the Court's ruling in Furman.
As an alternative to the manadory sentencing
statute, some states created a guided-jury discretion
scheme. For example, the Georgia statute provided
that: "Where, upon a trial by jury, a person is
convicted of an offense which may be punishable
by death, a sentence of death shall not be imposed
unless the jury verdict included a finding of at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance and a rec-
ommendation that such sentence be imposed. 77
75 See Mackay, The Inutilty of Mandatory Capital Punish-
ment: An Historical Note, 54 B.U.L. RFvA. 32 (1974). Mackay
quotes the editor of the Providence, Rhode IslandJournal
of January 9, 1838 as saying: "Unless the prisoner, from
his color or extraction, is cut off from ordinary sympathy,
he is almost sure of an acquittal." Id.
76 See W. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 7-9
(1974).
77 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3102 (1977 Supp.). The statu-
tory aggravating circumstances are set out in GA. CODE
ANN. § 27-2534.1:
(a) The death penalty may be imposed for the
offenses of aircraft hijacking or treason, in any case.
(b) In all other offenses for which the death penalty
may be authorized, the judge shall consider, or he
shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to
consider, any mitigating circumstances or aggravat-
ing circumstances otherwise authorized by law and
an), of the following statutory aggravating circum-
stances which may be supported by the evidence.
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed rob-
bery, or kidnapping was committed by a per-
son with a prior record of conviction for a
capital felony, or the offense of murder was
committed by a person who has a substantial
history of serious assaultive criminal convic-
tions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed rob-
bery, or kidnapping was committed while the
offender was engaged in the commission of
another capital felony, or aggravated battery,
or the offense of murder was committed while
the offender was engaged in the commission of
burglary or arson in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed
robbery, or kidnapping knowingly created a
great risk of death to more than one person in
a public place by means of a weapon or devise
[sic] which would normally be hazardous to
the lives of more than one person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of
murder for himself or another, for the purpose
of receiving money or any other thing of mon-
etary value.
This type of plan was intended to allow the jury to
particularize the punishment of death only to those
defendants who had aggravated the circumstances
of their offense in some way enumerated by the
legislature. At the same time, this procedure al-
lowed thejury to spare the life of a guilty defendant
if none of the statutory "extras" was present, or if
mitigating factors dictated. This scheme was de-
signed to reduce the jury nullification problem.
It was no accident that all states desiring to
retain capital punishment after Furman adopted
one of these two alternatives. Both of these statu-
tory plans were suggested by Chief Justice Burger
as possible statutory options in his Furman dissent.78
The Chief Justice found flaws in both of the two
alternatives, but they appeared to him to be the
only choices left open, consistent with the Furman
concurrances, for states that still wanted capital
punishment. Burger's problem with the mandatory
scheme was jury nullification. Implicit in his opin-
ion was the concept that not all criminals convicted
(5) The murder of a judicial official, former
judicial official, district attorney or solicitor or
former district attorney or solicitor during or
because of the exercise of his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to
commit murder or committed murder as an
agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed rob-
bery or kidnapping was outrageously or wan-
tonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it in-
volved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggra-
vated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed
against any peace officer, corrections employee
or fireman while engaged in the performance
of his official duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by
a person in, or who has escaped from, the
lawful custody of a peace officer or place of
lawful confinement.
(10) The murder was committed for the pur-
pose of avoiding, interfering with, or prevent-
ing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of
lawful confinement, of himself or another.
(c) The statutory instructions as determined by the
trial judge to be warranted by the evidence shall be
given in charge and in writing to the jury for its
deliberation. Thejury, if its verdict be a recommen-
dation of death, shall designate in writing, signed
by the foreman of the jury, the aggravating circum-
stance or circumstances which it found beyond a
reasonable doubt. In non-jury cases the judge shall
make such designation. Except in cases of treason
or aircraft hijacking, unless at least one of the
statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in
section 27-2534.1 (b) is so found, the death penalty
shall not be imposed.
78 408 U.S. at 400-01 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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of capital offenses should receive the ultimate pen-
alty of death. The problem with guided-jury dis-
cretion statutes as the ChiefJustice saw it, was that
of codifying the seemingly infinite variety and
complexity of circumstances that might determine
who should and who should not receive the death
penalty.
79
The aftermath of Furman left the procedural
aspects of the capital punishment question divided
among those states that opted for mandatory death
sentences of strictly defined offenses, and those
states that chose to guide the jury's discretion with
defined factors the jury had to consider before it
could impose death.
LIMIrED ACCEPTANCE OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
The next set of cases to reach the Court squarely
presented the eighth amendment questions which
the Court had not decided in Furman. The five
cases before the Court in the 1976 Term asked the
two major questions left unanswered by Furman:
(1) Was capital punishment per se violative of the
eighth and fourteenth amendment, and (2) if not,
under what procedural mechanisms could a state
impose the ultimate penalty of death for the crime
of murder? Gregg v. Georgia' and its companion
casess t answered the first issue by holding that
79Id. at 401.
8o 428 U.S. 153 (1976). For a full discussion of Gregg
and its companion cases, see Note, 67 J. CRiM. L. & C.
437 (1976). In Gregg, the petitioner, Troy Gregg, was
charged with two counts of armed robbery and murder.
Gregg picked up two men hitchhiking, robbed them and
shot them in the head. The jury returned verdicts of
guilty and sentences of death on each count. Following
Georgia's statutory system of review, the Georgia Su-
preme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence of
death for the murders, but vacated the death sentence on
the armed robbery charge finding death an improper
sentence for armed robbery. It also found that the jury
had improperly considered the murders as an aggravating
circumstance to the robbery. 233 Ga. 117, 127, 210 S.E.
2d 659, 667 (1974).
81 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325
(1976). In Proffitt, the petitioner was convicted of murder
during the course of burglarizing the victim's home. The
jury recommended death and the trial judge imposed
that sentence after finding certain aggravating circum-
stances. No mitigating factors were found to counter the
death sentence. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the
sentence. 315 So. 2d 461 (Fla. 1975). In Jurek, the peti-
tioner was convicted of murdering a 10 year old girl by
choking and drowning her in the course of kidnapping
and attempting to rape her. The jury affirmatively an-
swered the question ofJurek's guilt and also the question
of whether the evidence established that beyond a rea-
capital punishment per se was not unconstitu-
tional.82 These cases further resolved the procedural
questions of how capital punishment could be con-
stitutionally applied by validating the guided-jury
discretion statutes while striking down the man-
datory statutes.-
Although the Court was not as divided as in
Furman, there was again no majority opinion in
Gregg or in any of its companion cases. The seven
Justices who voted in favor of capital punishment
gravitated to two plurality opinions. Justice Stew-
art officially announced the opinion of the Court
in each of the five cases, but only Justices Powell
and Stevens adhered to that opinion.8
4
Drawing from Furman, Trop and the general
background of eighth amendment cases, the Stew-
art plurality reaffirmed that the test of the eighth
amendment's cruel and unusual clause was "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the prog-
ress of a maturing society.8'' In answering whether
such standards permitted the sanction of death, the
Stewart plurality looked to objective rather than
subjective indicia of public attitudes. The fact that
thirty-five states86 and the federal government
7
sonable doubt there existed a probability that Jurek
would constitute a continuing threat to society through
continued acts of violence. The Judge sentenced Jurek to
death, and the Texas Court of Criminal, Appeals af-
firmed. 522 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Crim. 1975). In Woodson,
the several petitioners were charged with first-degrce
murder resulting from an armed robbery. During the
course of the robbery, the cashier was killed and a cus-
tomer was seriously wounded. While several defendants
entered the store to rob it, the petitioner and one other
accomplice remained in the car. The petitioner main-
tained he was coerced into the robbery, while one of the
defendants who entered the store claimed that another
defendant actually shot the victim. Petitioners were con-
victed of murder and as required by the mandatory
statute of the state, sentenced to death. The Supreme
Court of North Carolina affirmed. 287 N.C. 578,215 S.E.
2d 607 (1975). In Roberts, the petitioner was convicted of
killing a gas station attendant in the course of an armed
robbery with three other men. The Louisiana mandatory
sentencing statute required death as a penalty, and the
Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed. 319 So. 2d 317
(La. 1975).
82 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 169.
'aBefore the Court in the five cases were both the
mandatory sentencing alternative-Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325-as well as the guided jury discretion
model-Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153: Proffitt v. Flor-
ida, 428 U.S. 242; and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 280.
H ereinafter cited as the Stewart plurality.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173 (quoting Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. at 101).
"6428 U.S. at 179-80 n.23.
87 Id. at 180 n.24.
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enacted statutes since Furman calling for death as a
sanction was viewed as "the most marked indica-
tion of society's endorsement of the death penalty
for murder. ' ' ss Beyond the legislative response, the
Stewart plurality looked to jury verdicts under
these statutes as a "significant and reliable objec-
tive index of contemporary values. ' ' 89 The signifi-
cant number of verdicts (460) sanctioning death
indicated to the Stewart plurality that capital pun-
ishment remained "a continued utility and neces-
sity ... in appropriate cases."'
9
Mere public acceptance of capital punishment,
however, does not automatically end all eighth
amendment inquiries. Since the basic tenet under-
lying the eighth amendment remained the "dignity
of man," the Stewart plurality had to assure itself
that death as a penalty for murder was not exces-
sive. Such a standard of excessiveness requires that
there be no "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain" and secondly that "the punishment must not
be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime." 9' As a check upon unnecessary infliction of
the death penalty, the Stewart plurality looked to
the expedited appellate review provided for in the
state statutes to ensure that the capital sentences
would be proportional to other sentences for similar
crimes.92 The Stewart plurality turned then to the
two penological justifications of retribution and
deterrence to conclude that capital punishment for
murder did not involve "unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain" and was not "grossly out of
proportion to the severity of the crime" of murder.
Although retribution was not viewed as a domi-
nant objective of criminal law, the plurality de-
cided that neither was it a forbidden objective, nor
one inconsistent with the "dignity of man." 93 Even
though many might find the idea of retribution
unappealing, the Stewart plurality expressed the
fear that "the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigi-
lante justice and lynch law" are sown if society
comes to believe that criminals are not getting
what they "deserve."
94
Further, the Stewart plurality found that the
long-standing debate regarding the deterrent effect




91 Id. at 173.
9 2 Id. at 198.93 Id. at 183.
9 Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 308
(Stewart, J., concurring)).95Id. at 184-85.
the plurality concluded that such a complex factual
issue is better evaluated by the legislatures, not the
courts,96 and the Justices refused to hold that the
legislative judgments favoring capital punishment
were clearly erroneous.
Justice White authored a second plurality opin-
ion 97 which closely paralleled much of the Stewart
plurality's reasoning on the first issue of whether
capital punishment for murder was per se uncon-
stitutional.98 The legislative response to Furman was
used by the White plurality, as it was by the
Stewart plurality, to demonstrate that capital pun-
ishment was not viewed as an "excessively cruel or
severe punishment" for every crime.99 The wide-
spread re-enactment of capital punishment after
Furman was evidence to the White plurality that
life imprisonment was not "adequate punishment
to satisfy the need for reprobation or
retribution.' ° The question of whether the death
penalty served as a deterrent was admittedly not
open to final resolution, but the White plurality,
again with a view towards the strong legislative
response to Furman, would not "denigrate these
legislative judgments as some form of vestigial
savagery or as purely retributive in motivation.
'"'O°
Such legislative judgments are to be treated with
deference, and the eighth amendment requires that
the legislative plans to be invalidated only if it can
be shown that life sentences serve the criminal
justice system as well as capital punishment."°e Un-
convinced that such a showing had been made, the
White plurality refused to interfere with the judg-
ments of the legislatures."3
Justices Brennan and Marshall, adhering to their
Furman opinions, voted to hold capital punishment
per se unconstitutional.3 4 Neither was persuaded
from their moralistic opposition to capital punish-
ment by the fact of overwhelming legislative reac-
tion in favor of the death penalty. Justice Marshall
acknowledged that the legislative response was con-
' Id. at 186 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at
403-05 (Burger, CJ., dissenting)).
' Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and
Rehnquist joined Justice White in this second plurality.
9 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 337 (White, J.,
dissenting) [hereinafter cited as the White plurality]. The
White plurality's views were expressed in a dissenting
opinion in Roberts instead of in a concurring opinion in
Gregg because of their disagreement with the Stewart
plurality over the mandatory sentences being invylidated.
9 Id. at 353.
'0 Id. at 354.
'1 Id. at 355.
102 id
'03 l at 355-56.
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trary to his prediction that the citizenry would
reject capital punishment, but he maintained that
his prediction was based on the judgments of an
"informed citizenry," and contended that such an
informed society would reject death as an immoral
punishment.'t 5
The second major issue in each of the five cases
before the Court was the procedural problem of
how to constitutionally impose the death penalty
in light of Furman. It is here that the two pluralities
diverged. The Stewart plurality decided that the
guided-jury discretion plans in Gregg, Proffilt and
Jurek passed the constitutional standards set out in
Furman, while the mandatory sentencing statutes of
Woodson and Roberts did not.1°6
The White plurality took a more expansive view
of the standards set forth in Furman in determining
what would be a constitutional sentencing statute.
The unfettered discretion which the jury enjoyed
in pre-Furman statutes was viewed as a major factor
leading to the invalidation of such statutes, and
the White plurality considered the removal of such
discretion as the key to upholding a post-Furman
statutory plan. 0 7 Therefore, since mandatory sen-
tences for a narrowly redefined classification of
first-degree murder eliminated all jury discretion
in imposing the sentence, the White plurality
would have refused to deny the states this option
which the Justices viewed as compatible with the
Furman standards.'O" Accusing the Stewart plurality
104 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 227 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), 231 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
i5 justice Marshall cited Sarat & Vidmar, Public Opin-
ion, The Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment: Testing the
Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 171, as support
for adhering to his Furman position. 428 U.S. at 232.
10 Because the White plurality would have sustained
mandatory sentencing, the other two votes needed to
comprise a majority for the Court to reject mandatory
sentencing came from Justices Marshall and Brennan,
who adhered to their moral positions announced in Fur-
man. 428 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring), 306
(Marshall, J., concurring). The Stewart plurality, being
the most narrow opinion upholding capital punishment,
is the controlling opinion throughout these cases. Only
the Stewart plurality's views could ultimately obtain the
needed votes to form a majority of the Court. The Stewart
plurality could count on the Justices in the more expan-
sive White plurality to join in upholding the procedural
aspects of a particular capital statute. However, when
invalidating a statutory scheme which the White plural-
ity would uphold, the three Justice Stewart plurality
could anticipate the votes of Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall who had consistently voted against capital punish-
ment on moral grounds.
'07 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. at 346 (White, J.,
dissenting).
1o8 Id.
of not practicing what it was preaching, Justice
White admonished them for allowing what he
considered their personal preferences to make pol-
icy by invalidating the mandatory statutes through
misuse of the Court's judicial power.'0t The proper
analysis for the Court, according to the White
plurality, was not what statutory system would be
the best, but rather whether the system chosen by
those legislatures satisfies the constitutional re-
quirements. The mandatory sentencing procedures
did eliminate the problem ofjury discretion found
in the pre-Furman statutes. The White plurality
would not invalidate such statutes merely because,
were they legislators, they would have preferred
some other system.
Furthermore, the requirement of any jury guide-
lines squarely repudiated the holding of McGautha
v. California,n° according to the White plurality."'
This charge was raised by the dissenters in Furman
and because it went unanswered by the concurring
Justices in that case the White plurality again
raised the issue.
In finding that the guided-jury discretion stat-
utes were constitutionally permissible, the Stewart
plurality in Gregg began by establishing the limited
nature of its review on the eighth amendment
question:
We may not require the legislature to select the least
severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected
is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the
crime involved....
.... The deference we owe to the decisions of the
state legislatures ... is enhanced where the specifi-
cation of punishments is concerned, for "these are
peculiarly questions of legislative policy.""11
2
The Stewart plurality then interpreted Furman as
holding that capital punishment "could not be
imposed under sentencing procedures that created
a substantial risk that it [capital punishment]
would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner."'" In support of this reading of Furman,
Justice Stewart quoted Justice White's opinion in
Furman, as well as his own." 4 Emphasis, as indi-
'09Id. at 363.
"o402 U.S. 183 (1971).
"' 428 U.S. at 347-48. Justice Rehnquist reemphas-
ized this point in his separate opinion in Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 319 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing).
"2 428 U.S. at 175-76 (quoting Gore v. United States,
357 U.S. 386, 393 (.1958)).
' Id. at 188.
"1 Id. (quoting 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring)
and id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
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cated by these quotations, was therefore placed on
the capricious manner of imposing capital punish-
ment. While mention was given to other Furman
concurrances in a footnote," 5 they were solely cited
for support of the White and Stewart statements,
and it appears that alternative rationales for Fur-
man's results had been discounted. The Stewart
plurality concluded that the proper way to effec-
tively combat the problems inherent in the pre-
Furman statutes was to draft statutes that provide
adequate information and guidance to the sentenc-
ing authority. 116 The decision to extinguish a hu-
man life may be made only when all relevant
information regarding the criminal act and the
criminal, including both aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances, is presented to the sentencing
authority, thereby reducing the opportunity for
capricious and arbitrary sentencing. An expedited
judicial review procedure designed to corroborate
the sentencing authority's determination of capital
sentences further ensures the integrity of the overall
sentencing procedure. Therefore, the Stewart plu-
rality held that under such a procedural system
designed to take all relevant facts into considera-
tion and to have the verdict scrutinized by prompt
judicial review, the sanction of death could be
constitutionally imposed."
7
The Stewart plurality attempted to answer the
White plurality's reference to McGautha v. Califor-
nia"8 by distinguishing it. As discussed previously,
McGautha held that a lack of jury standards to
guide their discretion did not violate the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Stew-
art plurality noted that McGautha was a fourteenth
amendment case, not an eighth amendment case
as was Gregg and its companions. Therefore, in
view of Furman's precedent for the eighth amend-
ment that total jury discretion to impose or with-
hold death as a penalty violates the cruel and
unusual clause, McGautha can only be read as a
precedent "for the proposition that standardless
jury sentencing procedures were not employed in
the cases then before the Court so as to violate the
Due Process Clause."' 9 This distinction does not
seem persuasive in light of the past history of
capital punishment. The Court should have rec-
ognized it was explicitly overruling McGautha on
the issue of jury standards, rather than weakly
' Id. at 188 n.36.
1
6 Id. at 195.
117 Id. at 207.
"a402 U.S. 183 (1971).
"1 428 U.S. at 196-97 n.47.
attempt to distinguish the two holdings on the
difference between the eighth and fourteenth
amendments. This is especially so since the eighth
amendment only applies to the states through the
fourteenth amendment.12°
By its holding, the Stewart plurality placed the
emphasis of the constitutional analysis on reducing
the capriciousness and arbitrariness in the method
of capital sentencing, while placing no emphasis
on who was being sentenced to death.'12 In other
words, the Stewart plurality was relying on the first
120 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
121 It is interesting to note that at almost the same time
Gregg was decided, totally ignoring the issue of racial and
economic discrimination, a study was reported which
concluded that both the mandatory sentencing alterna-
tive and the guided-jury discretion model were unconsti-
tutional because both discriminated on racial grounds.
Reidel, Discrimination in the Imposition of the Death Penalty:
A Comparison of the Characteristics of Offenders Sentenced Pre-
Furman and Post-Furman. 49 TEMPLE L.Q. 261 (1976). Dr.
Reidel is project director at the University of Pennsyl-
vania's Center for Studies in Criminology and Criminal
Law.
The 1976 study of both mandatory and guided-jury
discretion forms of capital statutes was conducted by
Reidel to determine if the post-Furman statutes alleviated
the problems inherent in the unconstitutional pre-Furman
statutes characterized by unguided jury discretion. Rei-
del's study focused on the indicia of standardless and
arbitrary discretion in capital punishment sentencing:
racial and social discrimination. The premise of his in-
quiry was that if either mandatory sentencing or guided-
jury discretion sentencing failed to eliminate or alleviate
the perceived problems of the standardless discretion
statutes, (i.e. racial discrimination) then the statutory
alternatives would also have to be found violative of the
eighth and fourteenth amendments. Reidel, therefore,
equated the constitutionality of the post-Furman statutes
with a reduction of the proportion of non-white defend-
ants sentenced to death.
The results of his study indicated that not only did the
post-Furman statutes fail to reduce the proportion of non-
whites sentenced to death, but that this proportion ac-
tually increased. Id. at 275. Reidel also found that there
was no statistical difference between the two alternative
methods of sentencing. Id at 282-83. From this he con-
cluded that both types of statutes were constitutionally
impermissible. Id.
Reidel's study can be criticized for basing his conclu-
sion of the statutes' unconstitutionality on only one of the
three underlying rationales of Furman. Only Justices
Douglas and Marshall fully accepted the racial discrim-
ination rationale. Yet at the time the study was con-
ducted, in the post-Furman-pre-Gregg period, it certainly
could have been argued that a clear showing of racial
discrimination would condemn any system of sentencing.
Query: had Reidel's study been published a few months
earlier so the Court could have had time to digest the
conclusion, would the racial discrimination rationale of
Furman have been completely ignored?
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rationale of Furman discussed earlier."' Indeed,
there was no recital in any of the five Gregg cases of
the petitioners' characteristics.i2: In Justice l)oug-
las' Furman concurrence however, he took pains to
give a detailed background report of each of the
petitioners12 4 in order to demonstrate their low
social standing and thus emphasize his rationale
for invalidating their death sentences. The shift in
emphasis from who to how considerably changes the
outcome of the constitutional analysis. Under the
Stewart plurality's analysis, the guided-jury discre-
tion statutes completely removed the arbitrary and
capricious method of sentencing and are therefore
constitutional. Whereas, according to the Reidel
study, these same statutes, when applied, result in
the same type of racial discrimination Justices
Douglas and Marshall attacked in Furman.
The Stewart plurality rejected the mandatory
sentencing statutes in Woodson and RoberL because
such alternatives, although eliminating the type of
jury discretion found inherent in the pre-Furman
statutes, still had two related flaws. First was the
problem ofthejury being unable to take mitigating
circumstances into account, which led to the second
problem of jury nullification. Under the manda-
tory systems there is no way to differentiate be-
tween those convicted of the same offense. The
tnguided jury is impermissible according to Fur-
man, but, after Gregg, so is the jury left without any
discretion at all. The Stewart plurality pointed to
ajury study by Kalven and Zeisel
r' s for the prop-
osition that death is viewed as an inappropriate
sanction for many of those convicted even of first
degree murder.' 2' The punishment must be made
to fit the crime and the criminal, yet under the
' See text accompanying notes 46-50 su/ira. This ex-
plains the failure of the Reidel study to accurately fore-
east the Court's decisions regarding the post-Fumian stat-
ities even though both the Court and Reidel's study used
standardless and arbitrary discretion in imposing the
death penalty as their measure of alt unconstitutional
sentencing statute. Reidel's study focused on whom was
sentenced to death, while the Stewart plurality was look-
ing at how they were sentenced.
" Although one may reasonably suggest that from the
particular facts, the petitioners in Gregg, Proffitt, 111ooduon
and RoberLv were poor.
i24 408 U.S. at 252 -53 ()ouglas, J., concurring). Fur-
man was decided with Jackson v. Georgia and Branch r.
7exas.
i 2' f. KAI.VIiN & If. ZE'IAI., Tinl; AmMIoCI:AN JURY
(1966), cited at 428 U.S. at 295.
125 In further answering the White plurality'. attack,
the Stewart plurality noted that tinder the discretionary
•systems, death was imposed less than 20% of the timie for
first degree murder. 428 U.S. at 295 n.31.
mandatory sentencing statute.s this cannot be ac-
complished. Anyone convicted tinder a mandatory
capital punishment statute must be sentenced to
death, regardless of any mitigating circutnstances.
Therefore, death under these circumstances is con-
trary to the evolving standards of decency, is dis-
proportionate and is excessive. According to the
Stewart plurality, this would violate the eighth
amendment's proscription against cruel and unt-
sual punishment. 127
POIST-GRF,(x; D I-.;V-.01IMFNT.S
Reaffirming the dichotomy between the guided-
jury discretion statutes and the mandatory sent-
encing plans announced in the Gregg cases, the
Court struck down Louisiana's mandatory death
statute for killing a police officer performing his
dtuties in Harry Roberts v. Louisiana." The element
which distinguished this Louisiana case from the
previous disposition of Louisiana's mandatory stat-
tite for murdert'2 was the fact that the victim in
Harry RoberLr was a policeman killed in the course
of his duties.':1° This element brought the statute
involved' :" closer to the statute found constitu-
tional inJurek v. Texas,':' which the Cotirt upheld.
'2'.428 U.S. at 336.
'2 97 S. Ct. 1993 (1977).
"25 See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). where
tie Court struck down mandatory death penalties for
those convicted under other portions of the same statute,
l.A. R-v. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.
t30 The Court reserved the right to decide tile consti-
tutionality of a mandatory sentence of death for the
murder of a police officer in the course of his duties bv a
convict already serving a life sentence. 97 S. Ct. at 1996
n.:).
' LA. RE.. S-I'AT. ANN. § 14:30 (1974):
F'irst degree murder. First degree murder is the killing
of a human being:
(2) When the offender lha a specific intent to kill,
or to inflict great bodily harnu upon, a firemuan. or
a peace officer who was engaged in the performance
of his lawful duti.s ....
Whoever commits the cririe of first degree murder
shall be punished by death.
':" 428 U.S. 262. Ti.x. PENA. Coim. ANN. § 19.02(a)
(Vernon 1974):
A person counits all offense if lie:
(1) intentionally or knowitigly calls(-- the death of
an individual;
(2) intends to cause serious body injury and coni-
mits an act clearly dangerous to huiian life that
causes the death of ati individual: or
(3) commiits or attempts to conunit a felony, other
than voulutary or involuntary matnslaughter, aid
19781
Although no aggravating circumstance was to be
independantly considered under the Texas statute,
the Stewart plurality concluded that the narrowly
defined classification of murder for which death
was a penalty served the same purpose as a statu-
tory aggravating circumstance. Both served to
guide and channel the jury while eliminating ar-
bitrary discretion in the sentencing procedures.13
Therefore, under the Louisiana statute and the
particular factual setting presented in Harry Roberts,
it was determined that an aggravating circum-
stance, the murder of a police officer in the per-
formance of his duties, was properly found by the
jury. The failure of the Louisiana statute, however,
to allow the jury to consider any mitigating circum-
stances, unlike the Texas statute, 34 was found to
in the course of and in furtherance of the commis-
sion or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit
an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes
the death of an individual.
Texas law defines as a capital offense the commission of
murder defined in § 19.02 (a) (1) if:
(1) the person murders a peace officer or fireman
who is acting in the lawful discharge of an official
duty and who the person knows was a peace officer
or fireman:
(2) the person intentionally commits the murder in
the course of committing or attempting to commit
kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated rape or
arson:
(3) the person commits the murder for remunera-
tion or the promise of remuneration or employs
another to commit the murder for remuneration or
the promise of remuneration;
(4) the person commits the murder while escaping
or attempting to escape from a penal institution;
(5) the person, while incarcerated in a penal insti-
tution, murders another who is employed in the
operation of the penal institution.
"' 428 U.S. at 270.
134 Under Texas law, the jury must answer three post-
conviction questions affirmatively before the death sen-
tence can be imposed. The questions thejury must answer
affirmatively are these:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation
that the death of the deceased or another would
result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defend-
ant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct
of the defendant in killing the deceased was unrea-
sonable in response to the provocation, if any, by
the deceased.
Ti-EXAS CODrE CRIM. PROC. ANN., art. 37.01 (b) (Vernon
Supp. 1975-76). Texas courts interpreted the second
question so as to allow the defendant to bring to the
jury's attention whatever mitigating circumstances he
might be able to show. State v. Jurek, 522 S.W.2d 939-40
(Tex. Crim. 1975).
be the fatal flaw of the mandatory sentencing
system in Harry Roberts.
1
35
Assuming, then, that the Stewart plurality's po-
sition of a guided-jury discretion system with ade-
quate appellate review is the formula to a consti-
tutional death penalty, 36 Gregg and its companion
cases still left important questions open. The Stew-
art plurality in Gregg carefully noted that the anal-
ysis it applied to determine the per se constitution-
ality of capital punishment applied only to the
death penalty as a sanction for the crime of mur-
der. 37 What other crimes then would death be an
acceptable penalty for, and by what standards
would those crimes, if any, be selected? A related
question is whether the "list" of capital crimes
would vary from time to time, or whether once
established, it would be somehow locked into or
attached to the eighth amendment itself?
The case of Coker v. Georgia3 8 began to answer
these questions. Since Coker originated from Geor-
gia, the procedural question of Georgia's capital
punishment statutes had been authoritatively ap-
proved in Gregg. The issue, therefore, was whether
those procedures could be employed when the
defendant was convicted of rape instead of murder.
The victim in Coker was robbed, raped and kid-
napped. The Court was faced for the first time
with a sentence of death imposed for a crime where
the victim was not killed. To put it another way,
the Court would be confronted with a case where,
if the sentence were carried out, the only person to
lose his life would be the defendant. The Court
held that the penalty of death for the crime of rape
was always violative of the eighth amendment.3 9
Once again, however, the Court could not agree
on a majority opinion, even though seven Justices
did concur in the result. Justice White announced
the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Stew-
art, Blackmun and Stevens. 140 Justices Brennan
and Marshall concurred in the result, but again
only on their previously announced grounds con-
demning all forms of capital punishment.'' Justice
Powell concurred in the result reached in this
particular case, but refused to join what he felt to
be the Court's overinclusive holding.142 Only Chief
'3 97 S. Ct. at 1996.
136 There is no reason to assume otherwise, since such
a plan will continue to have the support of at least seven
of the Justices as the Court is currently composed.
137 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 187 n.35.
'38 97 S. Ct. 2861 (1977).
'
3
9 Id. at 2869.
'40Id. at 2863.
141 Id. at 2870 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. (Marshall,
J., concurring).142 Id. (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
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justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented. 3
The Court followed the same eighth amendment
analysis the Gregg pluralities used in determining
the per se constitutionality of capital punishment
for murder. Reiterating that an eighth amendment
cruel and unusual attack will succeed if the pun-
ishment is found "excessive," the Court once again
set out the tests of excessiveness as being (1) the
"purposeless and needless imposition of pain and.
suffering, or (2) ... [if the punishment was] grossly
out of proportion to the severity of the crime. ' 44
The Court then examined the same objective in-
dicia as it did in Gregg to decide whether death for
the crime of rape was excessive. Looking first at the
legislative response to Furman, the Court noted that
of the sixteen states that had death as a penalty for
the crime of rape in 1972, only Georgia had re-
tained that penalty for rape of an adult woman in
1977 .'4 The Court recognized that three other
states, Tennessee, Mississippi and Florida, had en-
acted death for the rape of a child by an adult.
46
Further evidence of the legislative response to Fur-
man was the fact that while eleven of the sixteen
states which initially had capital punishment for
rape in their pre-Funman statutes did re-enact death
as a penalty,147 only Georgia, Mississippi and Flor-
ida had arguably constitutional statutes on their
books by 1977. Examining legislative actions on
the penalty for rape in foreign countries, the Court
also considered the fact that out of sixty major
nations surveyed in 1965 only three retiined capi-
tal punishment in rape cases where the victim was
not killed.'4 Although not conclusive evidence, the
legislative response was viewed by the Court as
strongly indicating that death was an excessive
penalty, being contrary to contemporary standards
and disproportionate to the crime of rape.
9
part). Justice Powell would have reserved the question of
whether capital punishment is always violative of the
eighth amendment for rape by confining the holding in
Coker to say that death was an impermissible penalty for
rape of an adult woman where there is no indication of
excessive brutality or serious or lasting injury. He posited
the case of an aggravated rape where the victim was so
seriously injured physically or psychologically that "life
is beyond repair." Id at 2871 (emphasis in original).
Under such a situation, Justice Powell might be willing
to permit the rapist to be executed.
44 Id at 2872 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
'Id at 2865.
'45Id at 2867.
146 The Tennessee statute had been declared unconsti-
tutional prior to Coker.
147 Id at 2867.
'48 Id at 2868 n. 10 (citing DEP'r OF EcONOMIC AND
SOCIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS, CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT 40,86 (1968)).
149 Id at 2867-68.
As it did in Gregg, the Court further looked to
the response ofjuries to the cipital statutes. With-
out providing citations to back up its statistics, the
Court stated "that in the vast majority of cases, at
least 9 out of ten, juries [in Georgia] have not
imposed the death sentence [for rape]. ' i"t This also
indicated to the Court that death was an excessive
penalty for the crime of rape.
While neither the response of the legislatures nor
of the juries could foreclose the Court from making
a contrary finding, 5 1 the Court agreed with those
indicators and concluded that capital punishment
for rape, which by definition does not involve the
death of the victim, is disproportionate as a pen-
alty. Therefore, such a penalty is excessive and, as
a result, violative of the eighth amendment. 52
Under the plurality's analysis, once a determi-
nation is made that the death penalty is an uncon-
stitutional penalty for a particular crime, all states
are precluded from enacting that penalty for that'
offense. This all-or-nothing analysis allows the
scope of permissible capital punishment offenses to
shrink, but virtually eliminates expansion of the"
death penalty to other crimes, because a challenge
to a capital statute enacted in only a few states will
call for the same result as in Coker.
A conceptual decision-making framework of the
eighth amendment appears to have evolved from
the Gregg and Coker cases. The cruel and unusual
language of the Constitution has been reformu-
lated into two standards which the Court is sup-
posed to answer by examining objective indidia.
'The eighth amendment standard of Trop, then
articulated merely as the 'dignity of man," has
been redefined in terms of whether the penalty is
"excessive."3 The standards for excessiveness as
set forth in Coker are, if the punishment "(1) makes
no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of
punishment and hence is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and
suffering; or (2) is grossly out of proportion to the
severity of the crime. ' " These standards are to be
evaluated by such factors as history, precedent, •
legislative responses, jury responses and public at-
titudes regarding the particular punishment for the
particular offense.iss The intended purpose of this
5
0 Id. at 2868.
151 The Court stated that the Constitution required the
Court to be the final decision-maker regarding whether
a penalty'would be acceptable under the eighth amend-
ment. Id. at 2868.
152Id. at 2869.
: Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 173.
'"97 S. Ct. at 2865.
"5 Id. at 2866.
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conceptual framework is to remove the subjective
(i.e., moral) views of the individual Justices from
the eighth amendment determination."5 6
Examining the second half of the excessiveness
test, one result of the standards outlined above has
been that considerable emphasis is placed upon
decisions of legislatures and juries. In upholding
capital punishment in Gregg, both pluralities relied
heavily on the legislative response to Furman. Like-
wise, in rejecting capital punishment in Coker, the
plurality there also gave great weight to the legis-
lative action regarding the proper penalty for
rape.
157
Similarly, weight was given by the Court to jury
verdicts. In Gregg, the large number ofjuries which
sentenced defendants to death supported the leg-
islative response and led the Court to conclude
capital punishment was not excessive. In Coker, the
failure of juries to sentence a large number of
defendants to death for committing rape, was
viewed by the Court as an important factor in
rejecting capital punishment for that crime.
Thus, in answer to whether a capital penalty is
or is not grossly out of proportion to the severity of
the crime, the objective indicia used by the Court
do remove the subjective views of the individual
Justices from the constitutional equation. How-
ever, the current eighth amendment inquiry does
not end with a counting of legislatures and juries.
The remaining standard-the penalty of death
"makes no measurable contribution to acceptable
goals of punishment and hence is nothing more
than the purposeless and needless imposition of
pain and suffering"l 5 -must also be met. It is in
this test that the preferences of the individual
Justices may be most prevalent. The standard is
phrased in terms such as "measurable contribu-
tion," "acceptable goals" and "purposeless and
needless imposition of pain" so that answers cannot
" Id. at 2865-66.
'5- Further support for the proposition that looking to
legislative decisions is the proper indicia of eighth amend-
ment standards can be found in eighth amendment cases
outside of the criminal justice system. In Estelle v. Gam-
ble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Court assessed a prisoner's
eighth amendment claim to receive adequate medical
treatment in Texas by examining the contemporary stan-
dards regarding treatment of prisoners. To make the
needed determination of what those standards were, the
Court looked to legislation in 22 states calling for pris-
oners to be medically cared for by the public since, being
deprived of their liberty, they are unable to care for
themselves. Id. at 103-04. The Court took these legislative
statements as evidence of contemporary standards that
such medical care must be provided. Id.
'58 Coker v. Georgia, 97 S. Ct. at 2865.
be authoritatively deduced from the objective in-
dicia the Court examines. It is difficult to see how
a legislature's decision to authorize capital punish-
ment, or ajury's willingness to impose that penalty,
answers the question of whether a contribution is
being made to acceptable goals of punishment.
Justification for capital punishment in terms of
acceptable goals is expressed in terms of deterrence
and retribution, and it is in evaluating whether
these goals are legitimately furthered that the in-
dividual views of the Justices come to the forefront.
Justice Brennan has concluded that these goals are
never served by capital punishment. In fact, Bren-
nan disavows the goal of retribution as even a
legitimate goal of the criminal justice system. No
showing of objective indicia has persuaded him
that legitimate goals of punishment are being
served.
The rest of the Court has attempted to keep their
personal views out of the judicial reasoning, but
only with varying degrees of success. Justice Mar-
shall allowed his own views to influence his vote
when he was faced in Gregg with overwhelming
legislative support of capital punishment for mur-
der. He adhered to his Furman position that if the
people really knew all the facts they would be
opposed to capital punishment. 59
In Gregg and Coker all of the plurality opinions
decided whether death could be imposed by ex-
amining the legislative response, thus apparently -
leaving subjective factors out of the inquiry. But in
both cases, the plurality opinions indicated that
the legislative responses were not fully controlling.
In Coker, the Court compared the "moral deprav-
ity" of rape with that of murder. Because rape, by
definition, does not involve the taking of a life, the
Court concluded that rape does not equal the
moral depravity of murder.'" As a result, rape did
not fit into the category of the most extreme crimes
and, therefore, the penalty of death was found to
be excessive.
The conclusion that rape does not fit into the
category of the most extreme offenses must be
based, to some extent, on moral attitudes of the
Justices. There are no clear objectives delineating
what should be included in a category described
only as the "most extreme crimes." The Chief
Justice and Justice Rehnquist, in dissenting from
Coker,'61 attacked the plurality's opinion because of
its moralistic assumptions. The dissenters, focusing
'59 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 232 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
160 97 S. Ct. at 2869.
161 Id. at 2872 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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on the particular petitioner before the Court, 62
would not keep the State from imposing the death
penalty for rape where aggravating circumstances
warranted the penalty.
From the cases decided by the Court since Fur-
man, two principles seem to have been articulated
in determining whether a penalty is excessive. First,
the Court will give great weight to the collective
judgment of the state legislatures, and second,
capital punishment is a penalty which may be
imposed only when the life of the victim has been
taken by the defendant. So far, no conflict between
these two principles has arisen because only the
crime of murder commands the support of a ma-
jority of the legislatures. But if these two principles
are an accurate reading of the Court, then a con-
flict would arise should a large number of states
enact capital punishment for a crime which did
not involve the death of its victim, such as mass
terrorism t16 or skyjacking.' 64 Assuming that juries
would impose the death penalty for an aggravated
case of terrorism, the Court would be squarely
faced with the conflict between objective indicia
and moralistic conviction. Based upon Coker, it
would appear that the Court would reject capital
punishment in such a situation, because death
would be considered an excessive penalty for the
162 The petitioner in Coker had a long and dangerous
record. The petitioner was already serving substantial
prison sentences for two previous rapes when he escaped
from prison and committed the rape offense which the
Court was reviewing.
'63 The following analysis depends on a factual setting
in which a substantial number of states have enacted
capital punishment for a crime such as skyjacking before
the first case can be brought before the Supreme Court.
If only a few states enact such a penalty, and the Court
entertains a capital case under such a statute, the Court
would likely strike it down based upon the Coker holding
that there is no objective indicia of societal support for
the death penalty for that offense. The Court would thus
conclude that the death penalty was contrary to contem-
porary standards. The textual analysis depends upon a
record which presents the Court with a true conflict
between majority legislative support and the principle
that capital punishment should be reserved for murder.
Under the Court's all-or-nothing analysis in Coker, a
finding that death is inappropriate for skyjacking effec-
tively would preclude all states from legislating capital
punishment for that crime. See 97 S. Ct. at 2870 (Powell,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
164 Congress enacted in 1974 a capital punishment
statute for skyjacking. 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (i) (1974) pro-
vides, "(1) Whoever commits or attempts to commit
aircraft piracy, as herein defined, shall be punished-
... (B) if the death of another person results from the
commission or attempted commission of the offense, by
death or by imprisonment for life."
terrorist who did not take a human life, just as it
was for the rapist.
This result totally removes any consideration of
objective indicia from the constitutional equation.
The personal, moralistic views of theJustices would
have governed the disposition of the constitutional
question, the very result the standards enunciated
in Gregg and Coker were designed to eliminate. At
that point, the Court comes close to Justice Bren-
nan's position first articulated in Furman that cap-
ital punishment is invalid based on his interpreta-
tion of "moral concepts" consistent with the dignity
of man. The only difference between the positions
of Justices Brennan, Marshall and the Coker plu-
rality is where the line of constitutionality is drawn.
For Brennan and Marshall, all capital punishment
is "cruel and unusual." The Coker plurality would
allow the ultimate penalty of death to be applied
for the crime of murder, but for no other offense.
Because of the imprecise language of the eighth
amendment it is possible that its authors intended
cruel and unusual punishments to be judged by a
standard which reflects the changing mores of
society. If so, then the Court's analysis should be
limited to discovering current societal mores and
not inject their own views. The test under such .art
interpretation would approximate the analysis the
Court undertakes when it examines only the objec-
tive indicia of contemporary values-legislative ac-
tion and jury decisions. This type of standard
would allow some flexibility in determining current
societal values, yet would not allow the Court to
reject a clear preference for the death penalty for
any particular crime. The pure objective test would
also allow the scope of permissible capital punish-
ment to vary from time to time in accordance with
contemporary values. Under the current standard
of determining the constitutionality of capital pun-
ishment, such flexibility has apparently been re-
moved, regardless of societal values.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps, in the final analysis, the resolution" of
whether there is to be capital punishment will
inevitably be governed by subjective considera-
tions. Legislators will initially make that judgment
in approving the penalty, jurors will make that
decision in imposing the penalty, and judges will
make that decision in approving the penalty. The
Court has tried to establish tests which eliminate
these subjective considerations from their review,
leaving those considerations to be made elsewhere.




The history of capital punishment in America
has passed through periods of unarticulated ac-
ceptance in the nineteenth century to nearly total
repudiation in the Furman case to a limited accept-
ance which is evidenced by the post-Furman deci-
sions. The category of offenses for which the death
penalty can constitutionally be imposed has been
limited to the crime of murder. The standards by
which the penalty is measured are a combination
of objective indicia and subjective conclusions. The
Court's analysis, however, indicates that should
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these two principles ever come into conflict, the
latter would prevail. Thus, for all practical pur-
poses, the standard of constitutionality really de-
pends upon the subjective values of a majority of
the Court. The point where the constitutional line
is to be drawn varies among some of the Justices,
but it is clear from the most recent Supreme Court
cases that wherever the line is drawn, it will be, in
the end, the result of the subjective views of the
individual Justices.
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